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Since the beginning of the 20th century, the classics of sociology were convinced that 
society was going through a modernization process. The pioneer German sociologist Max 
Weber observed the customs of his day as rational and his modernization theory lays great 
stress that “as societies industrialize, urbanize and develop technologically, the appeal of 
religion – with all its mystery and acceptance of faith – will diminish. Society will 
secularize” (Esposito, Sonn and Voll 2016, 5). Contemporarily it is safe to assume that we 
live in a modern world and it is widely associated with being ‘secular’, as it becomes a 
central modern category – or the defining characteristics of processes of modernization – 
to formulate a realm differentiated from the religious (Casanova 2009, 1049). Though, 
there is no to little consensus on what secular means. The idea of secular is mainly a 
Christian construct, which can not be observed in the same manner around the globe, as 
societies went through different modernization processes. Western academics, who tried to 
find ‘the’ definition of secular, were challenged by non-western academics constantly.1 As 
a result of this, the debate on secularism was widened by the ‘multiple secularities’ thesis, 
wherein the concept of secularism was differentiated by numerous scholars (Wohlrab-Sahr 
and Burchardt 2012). 
Moreover, according to Casanova (2009), a distinction between secularism as an ideology 
and secularism as a statecraft principle have to be made. In this sense, secularism as a state 
principle is “some principle of seperation between the religious and political authority, 
either for the sake of neutrality towards all religions, or for the sake of protecting the 
freedom of conscience of each individual, or for the sake of facilitating the equal access of 
all citizens to democratic participation” (ibid., 1051). It is also stated by Casanova, that  
every form of secularism entails two principles, namely the principle of separation2 and the 
principle of state regulation of religion in society3 (ibid., 1061). The particular form and its 
resemblance to democracy is then determined by the  relationship between these two 
principles (ibid.). Under this assumption, various forms of secularities were distinguished, 
which can be observed empirically in various countries. 
                                                
1Among others; Charles Taylor, José Casanova, Talal Asad, Peter Berger, Abdolkarim Soroush, Rajeev 
Bhargava are the pioneers to this subject. 
2 No establishment. 
3 Free exercise. 
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This brings us to our case study: The Turkish Republic. The modern Turkish Republic 
has a predominantly Muslim population.  However, it is widely considered as a “Torn 
Country” (Huntington 1996) or the ‘the bridge between the orient and occident’ by 
scholars and journalists as Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution states the following:  
“The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State governed by the 
rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and 
justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on 
the fundamental tenets4 set forth in the Preamble” 5 (T.C Anayasası, 1982).  
However, a democratic government must embrace the pluralistic values that respect 
fundamental liberties of its citizens and it should offer protection to minority rights with 
its constitution (Stepan 2000, 39). In that respect, Turkish democracy was strongly 
criticized by the Islamist elite, as Pro-Islamic parties were numerously forced to dissolve 
by the Turkish Supreme Court and the Army to protect the Kemalist idea of secularism. 
Another point of critique was the establishment of a State-Religion governed by the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). This was seen as a restriction of religious 
freedom that led to a reactionary political development by the Pro-Islamic elite. When the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) first came to power in 2002, a new wave of 
criticism started. The secular Kemalists point to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s, one of the 
founding father of AKP and former Prime Minister and current President of Turkey, 
statements like “One can’t be a secular and a Muslim at the same time”6 and “Will this 
democracy be the goal or the tool?”7. Today, concerns of the secular Kemalist reach a 
high point, after the President of the Turkish Parliament stated that overwhelmingly 
Muslim Turkey needed a religious constitution, “a proposal which contradicts the modern 
republic’s founding principles” (Yackley and Gürses, 2016). Thus, the debate over 
secularism in Turkey gained national and international public attention, as articles like 
“Säkularisierung in der Türkei: Eine Fromme Lüge” (van Gent, 2016) were published. 
                                                
4 These tenets are based on the Kemalist ideology of republicanism, nationalism, statism, secularism, 
pluralism and revolutionism. 
5 Translation available at: http://www.constitution.org/cons/turkey/part1.htm  The Turkish Constitution 
can be accessed through https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa82.htm . Last accessed on 
18.05.2016. 
6 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-millet-isterse-laiklik-tabii-ki-gidecek-38260315 Last accessed on 
18.05.2016. 
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NG9O3dDsxNY Last accessed on 18.05.2016. 
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While the debate over secularism in Turkey grows, I ask the following questions: Are the 
problems concerning fundamental liberties in Turkey lying within the Turkish 
secularism? Is the ‘Turkish secularism’ compatible with democracy?  
To answer these questions I will take the following steps. Firstly, I am going to explain 
what secularism is by differentiating the contemporary understandings of secularism to 
establish a theoretical ground (2.1.). Following that, I am going to shift my focus to 
different conceptions of Turkish secularism (2.2.) – namely assertive secularism (2.2.2.) 
and passive secularism (2.2.3.). In order to understand the Turkish secularism, I will look 
at how religion was governed in Ottoman Empire, as the modern Turkish Republic rose 
rather from the ashes of the fallen Empire (2.2.1.). Afterwards, I am going to put the 
Turkish Secularism into relation with democracy (3.) by analyzing policies towards 
religion on certain issues – seriatim: Freedom of Expression (3.1.), Freedom of Religion 
(3.2.) and Minority Rights (3.3.). In conclusion, I am aiming to find the answer to the 
question of whether the ‘Turkish secularism’ is giving enough space to fundamental 
liberties and if it is compatible with democracy. 
2. Secularism 
 
2.1. Understanding Secularism 
 
The classical modernization theory assumes that the modern cultural program, as it was 
developed in Europe, will eventually dominate all the modernizing and modern societies 
(Eisenstadt 2000, 1). The theory of secularization is of great significance within the 
‘classic’ modernization theory. It assumes that “the worldwide spread of the concepts of 
the nation state, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, the liberal market economy 
and the rational science would give rise to a similar model of social organization in which  
religion would be largely confined to the private domain” (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt 
2012, 876). Hence, as we go through the literature on the contremporary modern world 
and its societies, it was basically assumed that the public life was broadly secular. 
Academics, on one hand, wrote about different aspects of the social life – like social 
behaviour, politics or economics - as though religion did not exist at all (Calhoun, 
Juergensmeyer & VanAntwerpen 2011, 3). On the other hand, secularism was seen as 
 6 
something that did not have any significant ideology other than the ‘given’ absence of 
religion (ibid.).  
However, as the social sciences became aware of the fact that alternative modernization 
processes were to be found in non-Western cultures, the debate over modernization has 
widened by the ‘multiple modernities’ thesis. The most important aspect of this thesis is 
that modernity is not equal to westernization (Eisenstadt 2000, 3) and that the best way to 
describe the contemporary world is to understand it as “a story of continual constitution 
and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs” (ibid., 2).  
Following the argumentation that was used in the modernization theory, the debate over 
the secular, secularization and secularism was also widened by many scholars (see Asad 
2003, Taylor 2007, Casanova 2009). It has been argued that secularization is a selfsame 
process which can happen anywhere and that secular ideologies can be adopted in any 
country (Taylor 2011, 31). Though, it makes the understanding of a complex term even 
more difficult, as ideas vary greatly in their practices in different cultures, which is 
evident in the case of ‘secular’ (ibid.). For this reason, it is important for us to define 
what the secular, secularization and secularism in the contemporary debate mean, as these 
concepts are related but used very differently in various contexts (Casanova 2011, 54).  
In our modern world, the secular is basically the opposite of the religious, namely 
“nonreligious” (ibid., 55). Though, it is important to acknowledge that secular was first a 
theological category of Latin Christendom which has no equivalent in other religious 
traditions including the Eastern Christianity (ibid., 56).  
“The Latin world saeculum, as in per saecula saeculorum, only meant an indefinite 
period of time.8 But eventually, it became one of the terms of a dyad, 
religious/secular, that served to structure the entire spatial and temporal reality of 
medieval Christendom into a binary system of classifications separating two 
worlds, the religious-spiritual-sacred world of salvation and the secular-temporal-
profane world. Hence the distinction between the “religious” or regular clergy, who 
withdrew from the world into the monastries to lead a life of Christian perfection, 
and the “secular” clergy, who lived in the world along with the laity” (ibid.). 
                                                
8 Saeculum is the length of time equal to the potential lifetime of a person. 
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Though, the meaning of the secular has changed drastically over the course of time, as it 
started to encompass the whole modern reality by quasi replacing the “religious” (ibid., 
55). The secularism has become “a central modern category – theologico-philosophical, 
legal-political, and cultural-anthropological – to construct, codify, grasp and experience a 
realm or reality differentiated from the religious” (Casanova 2009, 1049). Furthermore, it 
is possible to find different types of secularities, as they are experienced and 
institutionalized variously in other modern contexts (ibid. 1050). 
Also, the theory of secularization within sociology is treated as a single theory that 
encapsulates the societal development from the primitive “sacred” to the modern 
“secular” (ibid.). Though, it is important to stress the distinction between the 
secularization as a derivative of the concept ‘secular’ and the sociological theory of 
secularization, as this concept is multidimensional and loaded with a wide range of 
meanings (Casanova 1994, 12).  Within the secularization thesis, three subtheses are 
necessarily linked: “1) secularization as a differentiation of the secular spheres from 
religious institutions and norms, 2) secularization as a decline of religious beliefs and 
practices, and 3) secularization as a marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere” 
(Casanova 2006, 12).  
After defining the secular and the secularization I would like to explain what secularism 
in our context means. In the recent debate one can distinguish between two kinds of 
secularisms: secularism as a statecraft principle and secularism as an ideology (Casanova 
2009, 1051). Casanova argues that secularism as a statecraft principle is nothing more 
than ‘some’ principle of separation – for the sake of  neutrality, protecting the freedom of 
conscience or facilitating equal access to democratic participation – which does not 
necessarily entail a substantive theory on religion (ibid.). Consequently, if the state holds 
a certain view of any religion, it enters the field of ideology, which can be called political 
secularisms (ibid., 1052):  
“Political secularism [...] does not need to share the same negative assumptions 
about religion, nor assume any progressive historical development that will make 
religion increasingly irrelevant. It is actually compatible with a positive view of 
religion as a moral good, or as an ethical communitarian reservoir of human 
solidarity and republican virtue. [Yet] political secularism would like to contain 
religion within its own differentiated “religious” sphere and would like to maintain 
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a secular public democratic sphere free from religion. This is the basic premise 
behind any form of secularism as statecraft doctrine, the need to maintain some 
kind of separation between ‘church’ and ‘state’, [...] or between ‘the religious’ and 
‘the political’“ (ibid., 1057).  
However, the most important question is, how and why “the religious” is separated from 
“the political”, i.e. social? In this regard, Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt’s (2012) 
contribution to the secularism debate plays a crucial role, as they “attemp to develop ideal 
types of secularisms [in Weberian sense] in a way that supports work on concrete 
historical cases” (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt 2012, 887). Therefore, it is assumed by 
these scholars that “the multiple secularisms that are taking shape in different countries 
and regions ‘respond’ to specific societal problems (as their reference problems) and 
offer solutions to them” (ibid.).  
In the aftermath, different types of secularisms were distinguished: “1) secularism for the 
sake of individual rights and liberty with the guiding idea of freedom and individuality; 
2) secularism for the sake of balancing/pacifying religious diversity guided by toleration, 
respect and non-interference; 3) secularism for the sake of national integration and 
development, involving the ideas of progress, enlightment and modernity; and 4) 
secularism for the sake of the independent development of functional domains of society 
guided by ideas of rationality, efficiency and autonomy” (ibid., 889f.).  
In agreement with the multiple secularism thesis, Ahmet Kuru’s (2007a) contribution to 
the debate enables a bordered view of secularism, which can be applied in the case of the 
Turkish Republic where two kind of secularisms – namely passive and assertive 
secularism – were differentiated. “Passive secularism […] allows for the public visibility 
of religion. [On the other hand], assertive secularism […] means that the state excludes 
religion from the public sphere and plays an assertive role as the agent of a social 
engineering project that confines religion to the private domain” (Kuru 2007a, 571). 
Though, according to Kuru, the dominance of passive or assertive secularism has its roots 
in the “historical conditions and relations during a country’s state-building period” (ibid., 
583). If there is a consensus between the religious and secular groups on religions role, 
the state will be passive secular (ibid., 584). On the contrary, if secular groups are 
opposing the public role of religion and religious groups try to maintain their established 
status, there, most likely, will be a conflict that will lead to assertive secularism (ibid.). 
 9 
“The critical condition that affects these views is the absence or existence of an ancient 
regime that combines monarchy with hegemonic religion. […] If such an ancient regime 
exists, it is hard to convince hegemonic religious groups to agree to the disestablishment 
of their religion. Moreover, the ancient regime also leads the secular elite, who oppose 
the monarchy in founding a new republic, to combat the hegemonic religion that justifies 
monarchy” (ibid.) 
2.2. Secularism in Turkey 
2.2.1. Management of Religious Diversity in the Ottoman Empire 
 
In order to understand the disputes over secularism in modern Turkish Republic, one 
must understand the Ottoman legacy of a complicated religious tradition, which has 
lasted over six centuries. As Barkey stated, there are four different strategies to ‘govern’ 
religious and ethnic groups within an empire, namely oppression, exclusion,  assimilation 
and tolerance (Barkey 2011, 35). While the coeval western Empires9 consolidated the 
order through religious absolutism as they enforced Catholicism over Protestanism, 
Ottoman Empire had an open and tolerant attitude towards the “other” (Barkey 2013, 
16).10  
The effect of the early encounters with the “others” played a crucial role for the 
development of this tolerant attitude. As the Ottoman Empire started its invasive politics 
by conquering territories in the Balkans, it started to rule over a predominantly Christian 
population. The census of 1478 shows the religious diversity in the Ottoman population. 
Within its European territory, Christians were the majority: Almost 81 percent were 
Christian population, as opposed to 19 percent Muslims. (Sugar 1983, 50). Though, as the 
Ottoman Empire continued its invasions in the  Middle East, the diversity shifted into the 
opposite direction, where only 37 percent of the population were comprised of non-
Muslims. Nevertheless, Ottoman rulers had to tolerate Christian society in the European 
territories to establish the order within the Empire (ibid.). Thus, the Ottoman model of 
tolerance can be defined with the following characteristics: 1) acceptance of diversity, 2) 
                                                
9 Namely the Austro-Hungarian Empire; An oppression in a different form can also be observed in 
Russian Empire. 
10 The Ottoman tolerance can be observed from 14th to 18th century. 
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inclusion of numerous traditions, and 3) the recognition of similarities between different 
groups within the Empire (Barkey 2013, 16).  
However, the governance of diversity laid down a ‘classification of some sort’ as a 
condition, separating Muslims from non-Muslims, which was known as millet system 
(ibid. 23). In addition to the Muslim millet, a Jewish, a Greek Orthodox and an Armenian 
Millet – as they were recognized as ehl-i kitap (the people of the book)11 – were 
organized around their religious institutions, with the goal that these institutions would 
‘define and delimit’ the collective life within the Empire (ibid.). Though, the main 
intention of the millet system based on a pragmatical idea to increase legibility and order 
by gathering the diversity under the Ottoman dynast, which allowed taxes to flow 
unhindered and the administration to run smoothly  (ibid.). “This administrative format 
provided [...] room for variation in the boundry, whereby groups with distinct 
organizational structures produced varying state-society arrangements” (ibid., 24), with 
significant legal autonomy and authority. This arrangement of acceptance of religious 
institutions made various groups more willing to accept the Ottoman rule (ibid.). 
It is not to forget that the Ottomans claimed Islam as their main source of legitimacy as 
the rulers of the empire were also the caliphs – the leaders of the Orthodox Sunni Islamic 
community (Barkey 2013, 20). Though, as a result of the particular construction of the 
Ottoman Empire, in which religion as an institution – that allowed to administer the 
empire – was distinguished from religion as a system of belief that provided an open 
space for various Islamic practices (Mardin 1991, 118). Hence, heterodox beliefs within 
Islam – namely Sufi and Shi’a Islam – were “allowed when these variations did not 
threaten the state. [However, they were also persecuted], when heterodoxies became 
amorphous […] or allied with the enemy” (Barkey 2013, ibid.). 
The tolerant attitude towards religions in the Ottoman Empire can not be observed 
throughout its entire history. As the Empire lost its significant power and started going 
into decline, various political and economical attemps were made to 
‘reestablish/reorganize’ the relations between the state and the society, that lasted until 
the 19th century (Barkey 2011, 345). This period can be seen as a period of new 
beginnings rather than a period of reestablishment, which was greatly influenced by the 
                                                
11 However, non-Muslim millets were considered ‘second class citizens’, as they were subject to higher 
taxes. 
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political and economical progress of the western civilization. Thus, 19th century is a 
milestone in Ottoman history, in which islamic influence over the society went into 
decline (Mardin 2011, 43). Due to the new trading laws with the western civilizations and 
modernization of the military and education in the West, it was acknowledged by many 
that reforms to adapt to the new age were necessary (ibid.) Especially, new trading laws 
had a crucial importance for this acknowledgement. It made way to a new judiciary 
process, in which the laws could be made without the influence of the monarch and that 
they can be changed if necessary (ibid., 43). As a consequence, the authority of the Millet 
system was questioned by the religious minorities and attempts were made to create a 
legitimite order throughout the 19th century (Berkes 2002, 176). This century has three 
different eras – namely Tanzimat-Era, Abdülhamit II-Era and Jeunes-Turcs-Era.  
Tanzimat12, as an Ottomanist era, was based on the multi-national imperialist model and 
aimed to reorganize the Ottoman integrity by establishing equality for all its citizens, 
which was seen as only possible through the abolishment of the Millet system and 
through the creation of an Ottoman identity (Barkey 2011, 380). Following Tanzimat, 
Abdülhamit II stressed the islamist idea and wished for a reinforced Islamic Ottoman 
Empire. This was an authoritarian move that aimed to create an Islamic identity at the 
cost of  religious minorities. At around the same time, Jeunes-Turcs were voicing Pan-
Turkism (ibid. 381). However, neither of these reorganization ideas could isolate 
themselves from the Ottoman traditionalism.  
Moreover, as the dynast was unable to control Islam, heterodox Islamic beliefs were  
challenging the religious order that led to religion based clashes. Consequently, at the rise 
of nationalism, Armenians in the East and Greeks in the West were supporting secession, 
as the ‘competing ideas to reorganize’ failed to embrace the plurality within the Ottoman 
Empire (Berkes 2002, 437).  
2.2.2. Assertive Secularism in Turkey 
 
It has been often argued that the Turkish secularism is related to the French tradition of 
Laicism (Barker 2012, 9). This French conception of secularism sees religion as 
something not associated with the modern world so that it lost its political significance. 
                                                
12 Literally means Reorganization 
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As a consequence of that, the interconnection of religion and politics is seen as something 
highly irrational and also dangerous. Hence, the main goal of this conception of 
secularism is to create a neutral public sphere through the strict separation of religious 
and state affairs (ibid., 8). In this sense, secularism, which was adopted in Turkey, has 
exclusionary similarities with the French laicism. However, laicism is utilized to protect 
the state from religion. In this regard, the secularism that was adopted in the early years 
of the foundation of the Turkish Republic differs greatly. In Turkey, religion was seen as 
something that should be controlled by the state in order to restrict it to the private sphere 
(ibid., 10). Therefore, we can say that the secularism, which was adopted in Turkey, was 
indeed an assertive secularism.   
 The historical and social conditions can help us to understand the reasoning why 
assertive secularism was adopted during the period of making of the ‘modern’ Turkish 
Republic. Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and the 
War of Independence the idea of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his followers (from this 
point on ‘Kemalists or Kemalist Elite’) on modernism played a crucial role in the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic and in the creation of a modern nation. Though, as 
Şerif Mardin puts it,  “neither the Turkish nation as the fountainhead of a ‘general will’ 
nor the Turkish nation as a source of national identity existed at the time he set out this 
task” (Mardin 1997, 14). Therefore, it is safe to assume that the Kemalist idea of creating 
a nation was a rather utopian one.  
Nevertheless, the ‘Modern’ was an ‘idee-fixe’ in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and 
the Kemalist Elite. For the Kemalists, Ottoman Empire, with its ‘govern-mentality’ and 
Islamic values, was representing traditionalism. Therefore, there was a necessity to 
detach from the Ottoman roots to reach a more rational and modern frame of mind within 
the Kemalist ideology (Keyman 2007, 220). Accordingly, as Mardin states, numerous 
transitions, as a pre-condition, were needed to create the modern Turkish nation and reach 
the immediate level of Western civilization: 
“(1) the transition in the political system of authority from personal rule to 
impersonal rules and regulations, (2) the shift in understanding the order of the 
universe from divine law to positivist and rational thinking, (3) the shift from a 
community founded upon the ‘elite-people cleavage’ to a populist based 
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community and (4) the transition from a religious-based community to a nation 
state” (Mardin 1997, 15). 
Furthermore, for these transitions to be successful, – thereby reaching the Western 
civilization – Kemalist elite set out basic principles13 by which the state should operate, 
namely republicanism, nationalism, statism, secularism, pluralism and revolutionism 
(ibid., 16).14 However, the removal of Islam from politics was the key aspect to reach the 
level of western civilization. Hence, secularism was one of the more important principles 
(Keyman 2007, 221). 
As a consequence, Kemalists initiated numerous changes to establish the basis of a 
secular rule after the Turkish Republic was founded: 
“The Caliphate was abolished. Religious schools (Medrese) were outlawed and 
education was left to the monopoly of the state. […] The abolition of religious 
courts in April 1924, the outlawing of mystic orders and sects (Tarikats) in 1925, 
the adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, the removal of religious law 
(Şeriat) from the criminal law and in 1928 the abrogation of the constitutional 
provision that regarded Islam as the religion of the state, as well as the adoption of 
the Latin alphabet” (ibid., 222)   
The Turkish secularism, adopted by the Kemalist elite, contained not just the strict 
seperation of religious and state affairs by removing all the religious symbols from the 
state, but it also stipulated the control over all religious activities by state officials aiming 
to secularize the Turkish people (ibid.). Thus, the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet) was established to control and regulate all the religious activities and practices, 
not only in public but also in the private sphere by imposing a more individualized 
version of Sunni Islam (ibid.).  
Additionally, as the Kemalists see secularism as the most important element of modern 
society, it was systematically used to marginalize religious life preferences through 
restrictive regulations. These regulations varied from new dress codes that prohibited 
                                                
13 Also known as ‘Six arrows of Kemalism’. 
14 Democracy is absent from the Six Arrows of Turkish republicanism. This was a consequence of 
Kemalist elite’s suspicion that the sovereignty of people would end up in the sovereignty of Islam. For 
further discussion: see Nilüfer Göle (1996). “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics” 
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religious clothing in all public buildings,15 to educational reforms, which restrict the 
cleric education under the age of 15 outside the state-established religious schools (Imam 
Hatip Schools) (Kuru 2007b, 143). 
However, everything considered, Kemalists argued that a modern Turkish society could 
only be achieved by a laicist secularism with a controlling quality as a political project 
and that it would, eventually, get accepted throughout the modernization process 
(Keyman 2007, 223). 
2.2.3. Passive Secularism in Turkey 
 
However, the Kemalist ideology, which was supposed to give way to the modernization 
process of the Turkish society, did not follow the course Kemalists anticipated it. Rather 
than giving the Turkish nation a more secular character, the Kemalist ideology could not 
overcome the prevalence of the religious ideology throughout the Turkish society. The 
presence of Islam did not just have an influence on people’s daily life, but it also formed 
their political preferences, which we can clearly see after the transition into a multi-party 
system in 1946 (ibid.). 
Up until to the multi-party transition, Turkey was ruled by the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP), which was the torchbearer of assertive secularism, as it was founded by Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk and the Kemalist elite. However, following the establishment of a multi-
party parliamentary system, central-right parties have become the dominant political 
actor as they embraced the representative role and importance of Islam in the eyes of the 
Turkish voters (ibid.).  
Democrat Party (DP) was the first political party that recognized the discomfort of the 
religious masses (Çağlar 2012, 22). Consequently, DP came to power in 1950, as they 
won the elections by receiving 52,7 percent of the votes (Aydın & Taşkın 2014, 61). 
Because DP posed the first liberal challenge to the Turkish modernity, the political 
significance of the DP can not be underestimated (Keyman 2007, 223f.). This challenge 
opened the gates for various groups with religious ideologies to stress their ideas socially 
and politically. Within these groups there were two main argumentations towards 
secularism in Turkey: (1) The Islamist view, embraced by the Milli Görüş (National 
                                                
15 including the universities, which I will discuss in the following chapter. 
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Outlook) Movement, which rose to political power numerous times between the 1960s 
and 1998; and (2) those of an ascetic, liberal view, embraced by the Hizmet Movement 
of Fethullah Gülen (Barker 2012, 12). 
Firstly, in order to understand the evolution of Turkish secularism into a passive type, 
we, briefly, have to discuss the influence of the Milli Görüş movement, which was 
initiated by Necmeddin Erbakan – an engineer, who had trained in the Technical 
University of Istanbul and RWTH Aachen (Esposito et al. 2016, 30). However, Erbakan 
was representing an alternative to the Kemalist Elite. He was committed to the Turkish 
nationalism but at the same time he was stressing the importance of Ottoman-Islamic 
traditions, as he associated the Western culture with decadence and immorality (ibid.).  
Erbakan started his political career in the beginning of the 1960s. This was a time when 
“increased urbanization and industrialization resulted in unemployment, hyperinflation 
and, concurrently, increased criticism of Western culture and new questions about the 
Turkish national identity” (ibid.). Hence, Erbakan saw a great opportunity to initiate his 
Movement politically, as he allied with small-scale entrepreneurs with islamic and 
traditional values and lifestyles, who were trying to secure a place among Turkey’s 
Kemalist capitalists (Çağlar 2012, 23).  
Throughout his political career, Erbakan founded numerous political parties, namely 
Milli Nizam (National Order) Party,16 Milli Selamet (National Salvation) Party17 and 
Refah (Welfare) Party. These parties provided the opportunity to express the ‘long 
suppressed’ islamic ideas politically (Özbudun 2013, 68f). Beside their economic pledge, 
National Outlook Parties commited to the moral renewal of the society, as they preached 
spiritual salvation to Turks, who had become ‘victims of the modern’ (Esposito et al. 
2016, 31). 
Welfare Party differentiated itself from the previous National Outlook Parties by 
becoming the first modern mass party, as it verbalized its mission to create a more 
socially just society (ibid., 32). Moreover, Erbakan criticized the Turkish conception of 
‘assertive’ secularism for not being truly pluralistic and respectful for the fundamental 
liberties – i.e. freedom of conscience and religion, of all its citizens (ibid. 33). 




This was, indeed, a constructive criticism of the assertive secularism, which showed 
signs of democratization. However, it proved otherwise, when Erbakan accused those, 
who “did not vote for the Welfare Party as belonging to the ‘religion of potato’, instead 
of Islam. Erbakan was also claiming that the political regime in Turkey would certainly 
be changed but the question was whether it would be done ‘with or without blood’” 
(Kuru 2007b, 145). Rather than giving the Turkish secularism a pluralistic aspect, he was 
mainly focusing on the issues, concerning ‘only’ Sunni Islam. This was percieved as a 
great danger for the Kemalist idea of Turkish modernism, since it mainly opposed the 
secular structure of Turkey (ibid., 143). In spite of the fact that the Islamist view18 did 
not contribute to the development of secularism, it signalled that Turkish secularism is 
open for a change.   
Secondly, Hizmet Movement can be placed at the opposite end of the spectrum. Initiated 
by Fethullah Gülen, a preacher of the State, Hizmet Movement had a different approach 
towards Islam and secularism, as it represented a civil Islam with its more liberal ideas 
on religion and state. It was mainly focusing on faith service, and avoiding party politics 
(Kuru 2007b, 143).19 
Hizmet Movement developed gradually. From 1970 to 1983, Gülen was locally initiating 
‘a’ movement by ‘enlightening’ his congregation about Islam with his preachs and 
Qur’an courses. Furthermore, Gülen was providing affordable housing for university 
students and organizing workshops on islamic education (Findley 2011, 387). However, 
after 1983, The Movement started opening dershanes (university preparation courses), 
private schools and universities all around Turkey, as new regulations allowed 
establishing private educational institutions (ibid., 388). The purpose was to help 
students form their personalities and identities, so that Turkish youth become not just the 
consumers but also the producers of modernity. According to Hizmet and his followers, 
this was the key to create the ‘golden generation’ of Turkey (ibid.). 
More importantly, Gülen’s ideas have developed through “engagement with both 
hegemonic Kemalist assertive secularism and counter-hegemonic Turkish Islamism” 
(Yılmaz 2012, 47). Gülen mainly focused on spirituality and worship in contrast to the 
                                                
18 At this point, Islamist view can be considered as Political Islam. 
19 “Gülen Movement had stayed away from Erbakan’s Islamist parties and voted for center-right 
parties” (Esposito et al. 2016, 32). 
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National Outlook Movement and Kemalists, as he believed that Islam can not be 
restrained in a political ideology (ibid.). He also stressed the importance that Qur’an is 
indeed the book of god, that should not be considered as a book on political theories or 
forms of state (ibid.). For Gülen, “Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a 
government’s general character, leaving it to people to choose a type and form of 
government according to time and circumstances” (Gülen 2006, 14). 
Accordingly, Gülen argues that there is no incompatibility between Islamic ideals and a 
democratic republic because of the fact that both can be seen as systems that can protect 
fundemantal liberties and human rights (Yılmaz 2012, 47). In this manner, Gülen sees no 
reason for an alternative religious state, if human rights and religious freedoms are fully 
respected (ibid., 48). More importantly, Gülen’s ideas about Islam with its relation to the 
modern society did not challenge highly skeptical Kemalist secularists in Turkey, as the 
Hizmet Movement entered the public sphere with a tolerant attitude, articulating the 
importance of ‘Interfaith Dialogue’ (Turam 2011, 70). 
Gülen’s ideas became more relevant for Turkish political discourse through Movement’s 
public outreach program. As the Movement grew mature, a series of dinners and 
workshops, namely Abant meetings, were organized to prevent a further polarization and 
to find new social contract for the Turkish society, where Fethullah Gülen gave key note 
speeches about the importance of  dialogue, tolerance and democracy (Kuru 2007b, 145). 
These meetings slowly became an open forum for Turkish intellectuals from different 
ideological backgrounds20 (ibid.).  
“The first meeting was organized in 1998 and was devoted to Islam and 
secularism. Its press declaration emphasized that God’s ontological sovereignty 
was compatible with the political sovereignty of the people. The second meeting 
also examined the relationship among state, society and religion. The third meeting 
focused on democracy and the rule of law, while the fourth one discussed pluralism 
and social consensus” (ibid. 146). 
Through the Abant Meetings, Fethullah Gülen’s ideas also gained acceptance by the 
Turkish elite. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the founders of the Justice and 
                                                
20 To name a few: Kemalists, Nationalists, socialists, liberals and Islamists. 
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Development Party,21 (AKP) who were at the time politically active members of the 
National Outlook Movement were also participating at the Abant Meetings (ibid.). As 
they, ideologically, got closer to the Hizmet Movement, they also cut their ties from the 
Islamist view by “embracing (passive) secularism as a principle that maintains peace 
among diverse beliefs, schools of thoughts and perspectives. [AKP’s] party program 
depicts secularism as an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience and rejects 
the interpretation and distortion of secularism as an enmity against religion” (ibid.). 
Even though, AKP defined its ideology as a conservative democracy, Erdoğan stressed 
that their understanding of conservatism did not involve the conservation of established 
institutions but the protection of important values (ibid.). The ideology of the newly 
founded AKP gained acceptance from various groups within the Turkish society. Thus, 
AKP formed a single party government as it received 34 percent of the votes on 
November 3, 2002. Henceforth, the assertive secularism has ‘allegedly’ evolved into a 
passive type.  
2.3. Interim Conclusion 
 
Before I move forward to analyze the relation of secularism and democracy in Turkey, I, 
briefly, would like to summarize the secularism debate and the conception of Turkish 
secularism to draw a more clear picture. 
As I mentioned earlier, secularism was defined as the absence of religion and it is 
considered as a fundamental aspect of the classic modernization theories. It was assumed 
that as societies get more modern, the importance of religion would decline and societies 
would be secular and vice versa, as it was the case in the western societies. However, 
numerous scholars argued that it would be unrealistic to think of secularism without 
religion, as different conceptions of secularism can be observed in non-Western 
civilizations in relation with various religions. Hence, the multiple secularism thesis 
gained importance. This thesis assumes that multiple secularisms develop in response to 
societal problems and secularism offers a solution to these problems.  
In the case of Turkey, we can observe two kinds of secularisms, namely assertive and 
passive secularism. In the period of making the modern Turkish Republic, Kemalists 
                                                
21 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (former PM and current (12th) President of Turkey), Abdullah Gül (Deputy 
PM, 11th President of Turkey) and Bülent Arınç (Deputy PM) 
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perceived the Ottoman traditions as a societal problem and utilized assertive secularism 
as a social engineering project to reach the contemporary level of  civilization.  
However, the presence of religion did not decline throughout the Turkish society. 
Turkish secularism was subject to criticism even after some stability was reached in the 
Republic. It was argued that assertive secularism of Turkey can not embrace neutrality 
against religion and pluralism. As a result of this, various social and political actors were 
trying to subside these issues. Though, up until Gülen’s ideas became public knowledge, 
there was no palpable success on this issue. However, as AKP embraced his ideas, 
religion was allowed public visibility up to a certain point. This is the point, where one 
can agree that the Kemalist idea of secularism started evolving into a passive type. 
3. Democracy and Turkish Secularism 
 
Democracy is not just a form of government, in which the power is vested in the people 
through free elections. According to Dahl, all citizens “must have unimpaired 
opportunities to 1) formulate their preferences, 2) to signify their preferences to their 
fellow citizens and 3) to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of 
government” (Dahl 1971, 2) to consider a government as a democracy. This can only be 
achieved through eight institutional guarantees: 
 
“1) Freedom to form and join organizations, 2) Freedom of expression, 3) Right to 
vote, 4) Eligibility for public office, 5) Right of political leaders to compete for 
support, 6) Alternative sources of information, 7) Free and fair elections, and 8) 
Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions 
of preference” (ibid., 3ff). 
 
However, in agreement with Dahl, Stepan argues that Dahl’s eight guarantees are 
necessary but insufficient conditions of democracy (Stepan 2000, 39). Although the 
elections are free and fair, a democracy must also have constitutional guarantees that 
respect fundamental liberties and protect minority rights (ibid.). 
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When Turkey is put under the scope of democracy, it shows a partly democratic Turkish 
government.22 As seven of Dahl’s institutional guarantees can be applied in Turkey, the 
reason for its democracy deficits should be found in freedom of expression, fundamental 
liberties23 and minority rights. Therefore, it is important for me, if ‘Turkish secularism’ 
plays a hindering role in these aspects, causing the democratic deficits in Turkey. 
3.1. Freedom of Expression 
 
Freedom of Expression plays a crucial role in the functioning of a democracy. It enables 
citizens to participate in political life effectively (Dahl 2005, 195). Citizens come to have 
an enlightened understanding about government actions and policies, as freedom of 
expression encompasses not just the right to express your own views, but also the right to 
hear what others have to say (ibid., 196). In this sense, freedom of expression allows its 
citizens – subjects of the democracy – to influence the political agenda according to their 
wills (ibid.). 
For the first two decades of the Turkish Republic, Turkey was ruled by the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP). CHP was imposing reforms to secularize the Turkish nation, as 
the party was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and it followed his ideas of 
modernization. These reforms were immediately internalized by the intelligentsia who 
were living in urban parts of Turkey (Karpat 2010, 350). However, the importance of 
religion within the Turkish population did not decline through the imposed reforms by 
CHP. Religion, still, had an important role on how people from the rural parts of Turkey 
conducted their daily life (Karpat 2010, 52). 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Democrat Party (DP) won the elections by 
receiving 52,7 percent of the votes, as they based their political agenda on the wishes of 
the majority of voters – mainly from conservative rural areas of Turkey – who had been 
feeling repressed by the imposed reforms of CHP. As a consequence of the DP rule, it 
can be observed that policies towards religion were relaxed in comparison to the former 
regime (Daver 1988, 33).  
In the midst of the 20th century, conservatives were considering Islam also as an 
educational ‘institution’. It was argued by the conservatives that Turkish secularism was 
                                                
22 https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey [Last accessed on 06.06.16] 
23 Freedom of Religion will be investigated under fundamental liberties.  
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diminishing the moral and cultural basis of the society, especially of the Turkish youth. 
Therefore, the importance of religious education was being stressed in public by the 
conservatives. As DP recognized the conservative will, religious schools (Imam Hatip) 
were established to educate government employed Imams with a more modern 
curriculum to meet the daily expectations of conservatives (Karpat 2010, 364). Though, 
establishment of Imam Hatips was not the only action taken by the DP. New regulations 
allowed all Muslim children to receive religious education up until the secondary school, 
unless their parents requested no such education (Daver 1988, 33).  
Furthermore, DP government abolished the law prohibiting the Arabic version of Ezan24 
in 1950. The liberalization of Ezan caused discontent within the secular intelligentsia. 
However, it was quickly adopted in the rural parts, as the conservatives were troubled 
with the absence of the mystical appeal of Ezan in Turkish (Karpat 2010, 363f.).   
During the DP rule, it can be argued that Islam became more visible in the public sphere. 
For the first time in the Republic’s history Ramadan began to be celebrated publicly and 
mystical orders (tarikats) and their religious publications reappeared (Daver 1988, 33). 
Moreover, a significant amount of governmental funds were used for building 
mosques.25 This amount was almost the same amount granted to the National Ministry of 
Education for the construction of new public schools from 1950 to 1960 (ibid., 33f).   
However, DP’s governmental policies, which gave religion a more liberal public space, 
was a cause of a dispute within the Turkish Army. Turkey’s first endeavor with the 
multi-party democracy ended on May 27, 1960 suddenly, when Turkish Army overthrew 
the DP government by a coup d’état led by a group of young officers (Szliowicz 1963, 
363).  
Following the military intervention, officers, who played an active role, established the 
National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi, hereinafter MBK), which was also the 
provisional government until the legislative body was returned to the civilians (Aydın & 
Taşkın 2014, 67). According to the MBK, the main task for Turkey was to return to the 
reformist policies of the Kemalist Era and this was only possible by ending the 
exploitation of religion for political purposes. In order to accomplish the return to the 
                                                
24 The call to prayer. 
25 Adnan Menderes – PM during the DP rule – stated during a meeting in Kayseri that DP built 15000 
mosques from 1950 to 1957 (Aydın 2002, 92). 
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Kemalist era, MBK gathered academics of jurisprudence to draft a new constitution that 
met the special expectations of Kemalist Turkish Republic (ibid., 69).  Thus, Article 2 of 
the 1961 Consititution reasserts the founding principles that Turkey is a national, 
democratic, secular and a social state governed by the rule of law (Szyliowicz 1963, 
366). The determination of its drafters to the founding principles of the republic is also 
evident as Article 153 states: 
“No provision of this Constitution shall be construed on interpreted as rendering 
unconstitutional the following Reform Laws which aim at raising the Turkish 
society to the level of contemporary civilization and at safeguarding the secular 
character of the Republic” (The 1961 Turkish Constitution). 
Moreover, the 1961 constitution granted the citizens various fundamental rights, 
including the freedom of expression and belief, which were absent in the preceding 
constitutions. Under the constitution, every individual is entitled to express his thoughts 
and opinions freely. However, constitution also defined the limits of freedom of 
expression, as Article 19 clearly dictates that: 
“No person shall be allowed to exploit and abuse religion and religious feelings 
or things considered sacred by religion in manner whatsoever for the purpose of 
political or personal benefit, or for gaining power, or for even basing the 
fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the State on religious 
dogmas. Those who violate this prohibition, or those who induce others to do so 
shall be punishable under the perinent laws. In the case of associations and 
political parties the former shall be permanently closed down by order of 
authorized courts and the latter by order of the Constitutional Court” (The 1961 
Turkish Constitution). 
The Turkish Constitution of 1961 was perceived as more liberal than the previous 1924 
Constitution by many, as it granted Turkish citizens number of fundamental liberties 
(Aydın & Taşkın 2014, 79). However, the new constitution also enabled a tradition of 
military interventions in Turkey. In pursuance of the articles that I mentioned earlier, the 
Turkish Army and/or Constitutional Court were authorized to intervene in the democratic 
process if there is a possible threat against the paramount of the founding principles – 
secularism (Özbudun 2014, 107). In this sense, Turkish Army and the Constitutional 
Court are perceived as guardians of assertive secularism (ibid.).  
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Turkish Republic underwent numerous military interventions. Although these 
interventions were to subside the political chaos in Turkey, various occasions were 
considered as a threat to assertive secularism during the coups. Couple of weeks after the 
military intervention, on May 20, 1971, Milli Nizam Party of Erbakan was closed by the 
Constitutional Court, as it was accused of organizing ‘anti-secular’ activities (ibid., 58). 
Furthermore, Turkish Army was once again ready for a military intervention because of 
the political disturbances during the late 1970s. However, a demonstration,  organized by 
Milli Selamet Party, the successor of the disbanded Milli Nizam Party, was the last straw 
for the Turkish Army that led to the Septermber 12 1980 Military intervention26, as 
demonstrators in Islamic clothing were chanting slogans like “Irrelegious state will 
collapse one day”, “Sharia is Islam, Constitution is Qur’an” and “Sharia or death” 
(Aydın & Taşkın 2014, 317f). 
Following the coup, military government drafted a new constitution, which, in the eyes 
of the army officials, could prevent the issues that led to the military interventions. 
Hence, a new dimension for checks and balances was constituted in Turkey, as the 
National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurumu; hereinafter MGK), comprised of 
government and army officials, was established to determine governmental policies 
concerning national security, which was widely perceived as the institutionalisation of 
the Army’s influence over politics (ibid., 431).  
Army’s influence over politics can clearly be seen in the ‘February 28 Process’, which 
was later called the ‘Postmodern coup’. Following the electoral victory of Refah Party, 
Necmettin Erbakan became the first pro-Islamic Prime Minister of Turkey (ibid., 411). In 
the mean time, Army officials were stressing the dangers of political Islam and were 
reassuring that the Army was the warrant of secularism and democracy (Ahmad 2006, 
210).  
MGK assembled on February 28 under the chairmanship of Erbakan. Military officials 
presented him the eighteen precautionary measures to prevent anti-secular activities in 
Turkey and forced him to accept the policies (Aydın & Taşkın 2014, 431). These 
measures were ranging from protecting the principle of secularism to more repressive 
measurements like control of media coverage on Turkish Army (Kılıç, 18 April 2012). 
                                                
26 Turkish Army seized the government until 1983. 
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Though, the most prominent measures imposed by the Army officials were about 
education as it ‘proposed’ 1) to put Qur’an courses and private schools, which are 
financed by religious sects under control of the Ministry of Education and 2) the 
extending of compulsory schooling from five to eight years (ibid.). As Ahmad argues, 
the extending of compulsory schooling aims to diminish the effect of political Islam on 
children from lower and lower/middle classes, as they can not be enrolled in Imam Hatip 
Schools before the age 14 (Ahmad 2006, 210). The action taken by the military on 
February 28 was considered by many as a threat for an another military intevention. 
Consequently Erbakan resigned four months after ‘February 28 Process’ since it was 
percieved as military control over legislative matters until the secular order is guaranteed 
(Cizre 2013, 126). Shortly after, Refah Party27 was closed by the Constitutional Court 
(Suavi & Taşkın 2014, 432). 
*** 
Turkey entered into a new period after 2002, in which the military tutelage over political 
processes was strongly diminished. In order to understand the drastic change in the 
military’s attitude, a recognition of how the Turkish Military gained its authority to 
intervene in the democratic process is needed.  
Throughout the Turkish Republic’s early history, the Kemalist Elite were, in a 
Bourdieusian sense, forming the dominant culture. In the eyes of the Kemalist Elite, 
Islamism and political Islam were perceived as a great danger for Turkey’s future, as 
they embraced an assertive secularist ideology. Thus, the ideological alliance of the 
Turkish Military with Kemalist Elite was habitual. Kuru explains the longstanding 
influence of the Military over politics with its ideological alliance to civilians, as the 
military could neither intervene in politics nor protect their concession over the last four 
decades without civilian legitimation (Kuru 2013, 150f).  
Though, a new Islamist Elite was rising in Turkey since the 1990s. As they were starting 
to be a part of the dominant culture in the beginning of the twenty first century, Islamist 
elite became more influential in the matters of economy, media and politics (Göle 1997, 
47). At the same time, AKP adopted a conservative democratic discourse rather than 
Islamism, as it was stressing the importance of good relations with the European Union 
                                                
27 Last political party of the National Outlook Movement. 
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along with passive secularism (Kuru 2013, 152). Moreover, survey conducted by Tarhan 
shows that only a quarter of the population were considering the idea of a military 
intervention for solving national problems as permissible28 (Tarhan 2007, 41).  
On the other hand, public prosecutor filed an indictment against AKP in 2008 and asked 
for AKP to be outlawed. “The 11 judges [of the constitutional court] voted by six to five 
for closure. Under the court’s rules, seven votes in favour were needed for a dissolution 
ruling” (Tait 31 July 2008). The court interestingly pointed out the lack of evidence, 
which indicated AKP’s intentions of destroying the fundamental principles – namely 
secularism – of the constitutional order by intolerance or by force. It also denied that 
AKP posed a threat to the public space. Moreover, the court had praised AKP’s 
constitutional reforms during the accession process of Turkey to EU. At the same time, 
the court was admitting that the AKP had become ‘the focal point of anti-secular 
activities’, opting to strip the party of treasury funding (Özbudun 2013, 173). 
In this conjunction, Turkish Army lost its status as the guardian of assertive secularism 
through the lack of public interest, and AKP’s policies toward religion were, indeed 
challenging the assertive secularist judges of the constitutional court. However, AKP’s 
adoption of passive secularism –  that reflects the general will of Turkish citizens, as 
AKP received 48 percent of the votes in 2007 elections – allows visibility of religion in 
the public sphere. 
3.2. Freedom of Religion 
 
Freedom of religion is one of the most controversial rights at both national and 
international level, as societies become increasingly religiously diverse. Thus, various 
fundamental questions about individual rights, equality and non-discrimination were 
raised, as various groups may not be able to secure their rights through democratic 
processes (Knights 2007, 19).  
These issues are often embodied in the wearing of religious clothing in the public sphere 
or in the establishment of additional religious schools in the international debate (ebd.). 
Similarly in Turkey, both assertive secularists and islamists (nowadays, passive 
secularists) are trying to shape the worldview of future generations (Kuru 2011, 181). In 
                                                
28 27% for CHP voters. 
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this manner, schools play a crucial role in the debate over freedom of religion. Moreover, 
religious clothing, namely the headscarf, was causing public and political controversy 
within society. Therefore, freedom of religion in Turkey is analyzed through the 
headscarf controversy and Imam Hatip schools. 
3.2.1. Headscarf Controversy  
 
Research from 2007 shows that, 63,5 percent of Turkish women wear some kind of 
headscarf, either because of their traditional or religious beliefs (Çarkoğlu & Toprak 
2007, 62f.). However women wearing headscarves were systematically discriminated, as 
they could not get any level of education or enter public buildings even as visitors – 
including university campuses, courts etc. – or become elected politicians, if veiled 
(Kuru 2011, 186). Above all, the ban of headscarf in universities was in the center of the 
controversy. 
The assertive secularist reforms distinguished ‘modern and educated women’ from 
‘traditional and uneducated’ women mainly by the absence of the headscarf. However, as 
a result of rapid migration to urban areas of Turkey, veiled women started attending 
universities in the beginning of the 1980s (Olson 1985, 163). This social transformation 
was perceived as a great danger by assertive secularists, and it was decided to use state 
power to eliminate the headscarf from the public sphere (Kuru 2011, 187). Therefore, 
military government ordered Council of Higher Education (hereinafter YÖK) – founded 
after the military intervention in 1980 to control the universities – the expulsion of veiled 
students from universities (ibid.). Moreover, the expulsions of students by YÖK were 
confirmed lawful, when State Council decided that: 
“some of our daughters, who are not sufficiently educated, wear headscarves 
under the influence of their social environments, customs and traditions – without 
giving any special thought to it. Yet it is known that some of our daughters and 
women who are educated enough to resist their social environments and customs 
wear headscarves just to oppose the principles of the secular Republic, showing 
that they adopt the ideal of a religious state. For those people, the headscarf is no 
longer an innocent habit, but a symbol of a world view that opposes women’s 
liberty and fundamental principles of our Republic. Therefore, the decision to 
expel the plaintiff from the university does not contradict the law. She is so 
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against the principles of the secular state that she resists removing her headscarf 
even when she comes to university for higher education” (Kuru 2011, 188). 
After the government was returned to the civilians in 1983, there have been various 
attempts to lift the ban on headscarves in order to subside the discrimination against 
veiled women. In 1988 parliament passed a bill that allowed to wear anything at 
universities. However, President Kenan Evren, a well known assertive secularist, who 
initiated the military coup in 1980, vetoed the bill on the grounds that “an absolute 
freedom of dress is against Atatürk’s principles and reforms, secularism and modernism” 
(ibid.). Responsively, parliament drafted and passed another bill the same year that 
necessitated modern appearances in the public sphere [i.e. universities]. However, this 
bill aimed to give headscarf a significant free space, as it allowed the covering of the hair 
and neck for religious belief (ibid.). Though, the Constitutional Court found this 
legislation unconstitutional due to the reasoning that “[it] abolishes the constitutional 
boundaries of religious freedom by allowing religion to pass beyond the individual’s 
spiritual life and to cause behaviours that influence social life [and that] the dress issue is 
limited by the Turkish Revolution and Atatürk’s principles and it is not an issue of 
freedom of conscience” (ibid., 189).  
Following the last decision of the Constitutional Court on Headscarf, a legislation was 
signed into law, which dictates that dress codes at universities are free, as long as they do 
not violate existing laws (Özbudun 2014, 110). This law was not found unconstitutional 
unlike the ones before. However, it was interpreted as a disallowance of headscarves as 
the constitutional court previously decided that wearing headscarves at universities was 
against the principle of secularism (ibid., 111). However, up until the post-modern coup 
in 1997, universities imposed the ban on headscarves differently based on the dean’s 
opinion on this matter, as the law did not explicitly disallow the headscarf (Kuru 2011, 
190).  
As public opinion polls show, 70 percent of the population was against the headscarf ban 
at universities (Özbudun 2014, 111). Accordingly, Tayyip Erdoğan expressed numerous 
times that there was not any institutional concensus29 for lifting the ban on headscarves at 
universities. Hence, there were no attempts to change the legal status of the headscarf 
                                                
29 It was clear that Erdoğan was referring to the assertive secularist subjects of Turkish Politics, such as 
CHP, Turkish Military and the Judiciary. 
 28 
during the first term of AKP, as it could be seen as a set-back for assertive secularism, 
party members were reluctant to arouse suspicions of assertive secularists (ibid.).    
However, the headscarf controversy became the most important topic on the political 
agenda during AKP’s second term, when Erdoğan stated that the ban on the headscarf 
must be lifted, even if it is used as a political symbol. Following this statement, AKP 
proposed two constitutional changes. “The first amendment made to Article 10 of the 
constitution, which refers to the state and administrative organs have to act in accordance 
with the principle of equality. Furthermore, AKP proposed to amend Article 42 which 
refers to the right to education, as AKP believed that the change of Article 10 would not 
be enough to ensure the lifting of the ban” (Bozkurt, 24.01.2008). Although these 
amendments were accepted by the majority of the parliament30, CHP applied to the 
Constitutional Court arguing that the amendments were against secularism, which were 
later declared unconstitutional by the court (Özbudun 2014, 111).  
Even though AKP was faced with a closure case by the Constitutional Court for 
liberalizing the headscarf at universities, AKP did not drop the issue from its agenda. 
However, it chose an indirect course to establish religion of freedom for covered women. 
In 2010, parliament passed a bill – initiated by the AKP – for a constitutional amendment 
“to liquidate the authoritarion, statist and tutelary features of the 1982 Constitution” 
(Özbudun 2010, 193).  Most importantly, the amended constitution allowed to change 
the composition of the Constitutional Court. The new constitution entitled the President 
to nominate – directly or indirectly – the majority of the judges. As the acting President 
in 2010 was a nominee of the AKP, the dominance of assertive secularists within the 
Constitutional Court was diminished (ibid., 194). Hereby, the possibility for assertive 
secularists to rescind a law that permits headscarf in the public space declined greatly 
(Kuru 2011, 192). 
Although the freedom to wear a headscarf was not made in to the law until today, YÖK 
issued a decree that forbade university employees to expel students with headscarves 
from lecture rooms following the constitutional amendment, which expanded the 
boundries of the freedom of religion (ibid.). Though, as Kuru argues, considering the 
                                                
30 The bill was passed with 411 votes for and 103 votes against (Korkut, 11.02.2008). 
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structural changes to Turkish politics, there is a higher probability for certain religious 
practices – i.e. wearing a headscarf – to be protected by law in the future (ibid., 193). 
3.2.2. Imam Hatip Schools 
 
Along with the headscarf controversy, Imam Hatip Schools were also of great 
importance in the debate over secularism in Turkey. On the one hand, it was perceived as 
a threat to the secular structure of modern Turkey by the Kemalist elite, i.e. assertive 
secularists, on the other hand a necessity for the conservative population. 
Islamic education can only be given by Faculties of Theology and Imam Hatip Schools 
run by the Ministry of Education. Along with the secular curriculum, Imam Hatip 
Schools offer additional courses, such as “reading of the Qur’an, the exegesis of the 
Qur’an, Islamic law, and the history of religions” (Kuru 2011, 193). As I mentioned 
earlier, Imam Hatip Schools were originally established as vocational schools to train 
government employed preachers. However, following the military intervention in 1980, 
new regulations allowed graduates of vocational schools to enroll at universities (Çakır, 
Bozan & Talu 2004, 67). As a consequence of this, the number of students, who were 
enrolled in Imam Hatip Schools, increased drastically from 207.006 to 511.502 between 
1983 and 1997 (ibid.). 
However, development of the Imam Hatip Schools was causing discontent for the 
assertive secularists, as graduates became active in sociopolitical life. According to the 
Generals, who later initiated the post-modern coup, the increasing number of Imam Hatip 
Schools was a clear sign of the danger of islamic reactionism (Kuru 2011, 193). Hence, 
various policies were adopted to marginalize Imam Hatips during the February 28 
Process. “One of the key reforms was to increase the length of compulsory schooling to 
eight years – thus preventing children from being enrolled in religious schools until the 
age of 14. [Secondly] the university entrance examination system was also reformed to 
make it difficult for Imam Hatip graduates to gain acceptance to non-theology 
undergraduate programs. [The assertive secularist reforms to confine religion in private 
sphere worked:] Imam Hatip enrollment declined from 11 percent to 2 percent of 
relevant age students, and the rate of graduates entering higher education dropped from 
75 to 25 percent” (Cornell, 2 September 2015).  
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As the main intention of AKP was to allow Imam Hatip graduates enter universities, 
AKP passed a bill to improve the opportunities of all vocational school graduates to 
continue higher education (Kuru 2011, 195). Though, following protests by scholars, the 
President vetoed the bill, arguing that “allowing Imam Hatip graduates to enter 
universities would violate the principle of secularism, which implied the separation of 
social life, education, family, economy and law from the rules of religion” (ibid.). 
Although the veto was considered a “set-back to religious freedom and equal opportunity 
– preconditions for a democracy” (NY Times, 6 June 2004) in the international media, it 
was perceived as a success for assertive secularists in Turkey.  
Nevertheless, in order to subside the inequality, there were additional attempts to 
improve the legal status of Imam Hatip Schools since AKP brought the issue in its 
political agenda. Imam Hatip graduate’s university entrance conditions relatively 
improved compared to the Era following the Post-modern coup. (Kuru 2011, 196). 
Hence, there is an upward curve in enrollment. In 2012, number of Imam Hatip students 
increased to 268,245 (Ergin, 9 June 2012). Though it is not to forget that conservative 
parents do not enroll their children in Imam Hatip schools to become preachers, but to 
educate them on Islam along with the secular curriculum (Kuru 2011, 196). Moreover, 
85 percent of the Turkish population support Imam Hatip graduates’ right to have equal 
access to an university education (ibid.). In this manner, it is to be expected that the 
conditions for the religiously educated will continue to improve through the more liberal 
attitude of the state towards religion. 
3.3. Minority Rights 
 
According to the UN Minorities Declaration:  
“States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage 
conditions for the promotion of that identity [and] Persons belonging to national or 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and 
in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination” (GA 
Resolution 47/135).  
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Turkey has a complicated history with its minorities. According to the Treaty of 
Lausanne, non-Muslim communities were considered as ethnic minorities in the 
Republic of Turkey. Hence, Greeks and Armenians were granted the right to establish 
religious and educational institutions (Oran 2004, 68). However, as the founding of the 
Turkish Republic was also a project of creating a nation, ethnic Kurds did not enjoy the 
same rights as the non-Muslim minorities, as they belong to the Sunni-Muslim sect 
(ibid., 72). Although Turkish has never been a spoken language amongst Kurds, they 
were forced to go to Turkish schools due to the turkification process, which led to the 
prolonged Kurdish question. However, as the Kurdish question is not completely 
relevant to the Turkish secularism because they share the same religion as the majority, I 
will focus on the Alevi minority in Turkey. 
Alevism differs from Sunnism in its beliefs and practices, which is more similar to Shi’a 
Islam. Although Turkey has a predominantly Sunni population, the number of Alevi 
population is estimated to be between 5 and 25 million31 (Solgun 2011, 27). As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Turkish secularism, adopted during the Kemalist Era, 
controlled all the religious activities through the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet). Diyanet’s tasks range from enlightening the public on religion to the 
establishment and management of places of worship32 (Gözaydın 2009, 113-135). 
However, mosques are the only place of worship according to Sunni Islam. In this sense, 
all dervish lodges, including ‘Cem Houses – Place of worship for Alevism – were 
banned by Diyanet to eliminate them from the public sphere. Alevis were forced to 
worship discretely in self-established Cem Houses throughout the course of the republic. 
Though as Diyanet started to build mosques in Alevi populated towns, it was perceived 
as an action to assimilate Alevism (Solgun 2011, 29). The Military Intervention of 1980 
increased the perceived danger of assimilation greatly, as Alevis were labeled as ‘devil 
worshippers’ and as various Diyanet members stated that Cem Houses are not places of 
worship, but places of jollification (ibid.). As a result of the longstanding discrimination 
of the Alevi population, assertive secularism was criticized by Alevis on being Sunni-
oriented (Keyman 2007, 25). 
                                                
31 There was not any governmental research on Alevi population in Turkish Republic. 
32 Diyanet receives 2 % of the state budget (Gözaydın 2009, 222). 
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AKP brought the Alevi question on the political agenda, as its party program underlines 
maintaining peace among diverse beliefs. Accordingly, AKP organized seven workshops 
to reassess the problems and requests of the Alevi population within the framework of 
democracy and fundamental rights and determine policies to fulfilling these requests 
(T.C. Devlet Bakanlığı 2009, 7). During these workshops various topics – namely 
religious practices, status of Cem Houses, religious pluralism and democracy and 
political experiences of Alevis – were discussed in detail. The workshops were perceived 
as a milestone for Alevis, as this was the first time that Alevi problems were recognized 
officially by the government (Solgun 2011, 55). 
However, since then, there have not been any consequent steps taken to subside Alevi 
problems. As of today, Cem Houses still don’t enjoy legal status. Moreover, after the 
Alevi workshops, Erdoğan persistently denied the Alevi existence, saying: “If being an 
Alevi means loving Ali, no one can be more Alevi than me. But if Alevism is a religion, 
Erdoğan is not there”  (Elçivan & Karaca, 11 May 2015). As a consequence of this 
attempt at illegitimization, AKP’s neutrality towards different religious beliefs was 
questioned by Alevis until today.   
4. Conclusion 
 
In the present paper I, first, asked the question whether democratic deficits in Turkey lie 
within the Turkish secularism. Secondly, I asked if the Turkish secularism is compatible 
with democracy at all. The second question may seem ludicrous, as secularism as a 
concept does not contradict the concept of democracy. In this manner, we can argue that 
Turkish conceptions of secularism are indeed compatible with democracy.  However, 
today it is observable that there are different kinds of modernities and secularities 
throughout the world. According to the multiple secularism thesis, different conceptions 
of secularism are created as solutions to problems concerning the interrelation of state 
and religion. Therefore we must accept the possibility that state policies according to 
these conceptions of secularism may not be democratic.  
Despite the fact that Turkey is a secular and democratic state according to the 
constitution, I argued that it is considered partly democratic. Therefore it is important for 
this paper to analyze the democratic deficits through the scope of the Turkish secularism. 
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk put out the task to 
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create a new republic with its modern nation. Though, modern republic’s relation with 
religion had to be different than the late Ottoman Era. As religion had it roots in the daily 
life of the Turkish population, Kemalists knew that it would be practically impossible to 
eliminate Islam from the public sphere. As a consequence, Kemalists utilized assertive 
secularism to create a modern nation, as it would allow the state to control the self-
established version of Islam. However, assertive secularism 1) facilitated the military to 
intervene in politics, 2) allowed restrictive policies against Muslims to eliminate Islam 
and its symbols (Headscarf) from the public sphere and 3) ignored Muslim sects 
alternative to the individualized Sunni-Islam completely. As a result of the assertive 
secularist state policies, a great portion of the Turkish population were deprived of their 
fundamental rights. For this reason, assertive secularism was criticized by Islamists for 
being non-democratic. Nevertheless, pointing at the tolerant attitude towards religious 
diversity during the earlier period of Ottoman Empire, Islamists in Turkey embraced a 
different form of secularism, namely passive secularism, that allows visibility of religion 
in the public sphere. Through the adoption of passive secularism, lots of the problems, 
caused by the policies of assertive secularism, were subsided. AKP mainly put their 
efforts to solve the problems concerning Sunni Islam, which set the ball of 
democratization rolling. However, issues concerning the Alevi population were shortly 
on the political agenda, which are later ignored up until today.  
In sum, considering the different conceptions of secularisms in Turkey, it can be argued 
that both assertive secularist Kemalists and passive secularist Islamists are selectively 
democratic, which is hindering the further democratization of Turkey (Somer 2014, 514). 
*** 
In my opinion, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and ‘his’ party are currently dropping the passive 
attitude towards religions and affiliating with assertive policies from an Islamic 
perspective, as new regulations are systematically imposing a religious life style in 
Turkey. AKP government started to convert secular schools into Imam-Hatip schools. In 
2015, a huge number of students were ‘forced’ to enroll at Imam-Hatip schools, as they 
become the only alternative in some districts for parents who can not afford private 
schools (Letsch, 12.02.2015). Moreover, a new regulation prohibited the consumption 
and sale of alcohol within hundred meters of mosques (Resmi Gazete, June 11, 2013), 
which can be perceived as a sacralization process. Furthermore, after the President of the 
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Parliament stated that Muslim Turkey needed a religious constitution, concerns of 
Kemalist elite on secular character of Turkey grew bigger, as they remember Erdoğan 
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